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[PiS]sing off the Courts: the PiS
Judicial
on
Effect
Party's
Independence in Poland
ABSTRACT

By winning both the presidency and a majority of seats in
the Parliamentin 2015, the Law and Justice Party assumed more
control in Poland than any single political party has managed
since the fall of communism. The party subsequently focused on
taking control of the judiciary as well, proposing legislation that
critics claim threatens the rule of law but the government insists
is necessary to rid the judiciary of corruption and inefficiency.
This Note discusses whether the bills go beyond the rule-of-law
norms in the European Union, as well as the EU's response to the
situation in Poland so far. It then proposes other methods of
influencing Poland's actions through economic and reputational
pressure. It further suggests that, while perhaps too late to stop
the Law and Justice Party's reforms in Poland, changes
originating from within the Polish judiciary could have
prevented this crisis, providing a possible warning to countries
facing a similar situation in the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2015, a single political party gained more control over the
Polish government than any other has managed since before the fall of
communism in the country. 1 The Law and Justice (PiS) Party took
control of the executive branch with wins by presidential nominee
Andrzej Duda and prime minister nominee Beata Szydlo. 2 The PiS
Party subsequently took control of the legislative branch by winning a
majority of seats in both houses of the Polish Parliament-the Sejm
and the Senate. 3 The only branch of government the PiS Party did not
control was the judiciary. 4
Shortly after coming to power, the PiS Party passed amendments
inhibiting the Constitutional Tribunal (CT). 5 The CT resolves
constitutional questions regarding actions taken by the other branches

1.
Rightwing Law and Justice Party Wins Overall Majority in Polish Election,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2015, 11:25 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oc
t/ 2 7 /poland-law-justice-party-wins-235-seats-can-govern-alone [https://perma.cclRD2WFQMZ] (archived Aug. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Rightwing Law and Justice Party].
2.
Adam Easton, Poland Returns to Conservative Roots with Law and Justice
Win, BBC NEWS (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34640535
[https://perma.cclX4MR-UKA8] (archived Aug. 5, 2018).
3.
Rightwing Law and Justice Party, supranote 1.
4.
GRZEGORZ EKIERT, HARVARD CTR. FOR EuR. STUDIES, How To DEAL WITH
POLAND AND HUNGARY 10 (2017), https://www.socialeurope.eulwp-content/uploads/2017
/08/Occ-Pap-13-PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/JSK9-YM7J] (archived Aug. 5, 2018).
5.
It is important to note that the controversy surrounding the CT began when
the outgoing ruling party, the Civic Platform, appointed five new judges to the CT. Two
of those appointments were to replace judges whose terms did not end until after the PiS
Party took office, and the CT ruled those two appointments unconstitutional. However,
the PiS Party refused to accept even the three appointments the CT deemed
constitutional, instead appointing five judges of its own, and the PiS Party's subsequent
actions have completely stripped the CT of its power. See Aleks Szczerbiak, Is Poland's
Constitutional Tribunal Crisis Over?, THE CONSTITUTION UNIT (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://constitution-unit.com/2017/01/19/is-polands-constitutional-tribunal-crisis-over/
[https://perma.cc/UTM5-T2E7] (archived Aug. 5, 2018).
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6
of government and state institutions. In July of 2017, the PiS Party
7
took another major step toward taking control of the judicial branch.
The Parliament passed three bills with the cumulative effect of
replacing all Supreme Court (SC) judges, and the top officials of all
8
other Polish courts, with new judges selected by the PiS Party. The
9
bills aimed to replace the former procedure for judicial appointments.
The replaced system relied on the National Council of the Judiciary
(KRS), a body composed of judges selected by professional legal bodies,
10
The bills
to nominate candidates for judicial appointments.
effectively placed this power in the executive office of the Minister of
Justice. 1 In what was considered a surprise move, Duda vetoed two of
the three bills. 12 However, Duda stated he still favored reforming the
13
judicial branch and asked Parliament to revise the bills. In December
of 2017, Parliament passed, and Duda signed, revised reform bills that
14
are almost identical to the original bills. The revised bills force 40
percent of the SC judges into retirement, as opposed to the entirety of
the bench, but still change the makeup of the KRS to effectively give
15
the PiS Party control over new judicial nominations.

Emily Tamkin, Polish Ruling Party Passed Unconstitutional Laws, Now
6.
Controls Constitutional Tribunal, FOREIGN POL'Y (Dec. 19, 2017, 3:17 PM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/19/polish-ruling-party-passed-unconstitutional-laws[https://perma.cc/U2BL-28B3]
now-controls-constitutional-tribunal-trump-law-justice/
(archived Aug. 5, 2018).
See Poland MPs Back Controversial Judiciary Bill, BBC NEWS (July 15,
7.
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40617406 [https://perma.cc/4Y7V-FUPX]
(archived Aug. 5, 2018) (discussing legislation giving the PiS Party more power over the
judiciary).
EKIERT, supra note 4, at 1-2.
8.
9.
Marcin Matczak, Who's Next? On the Future of the Rule of Law in Poland,
and Why President Duda Will Not Save It, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (July 19, 2017),
http://verfassungsblog.de/whos-next-on-the-future-of-the-rule-of-law-in-poland-andwhy-president-duda-will-not-save-it/ [https://perma.cc/J5UY-M65T] (archived Aug. 5,
2018).
Id.
10.
Autumn Callan, Thousands Rally in Poland to Protest Judicial Reforms,
11.
JURIST (July 17, 2017, 3:09 PM), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2017/07/thousandsrally-in-poland-to-protest-judicial-reforms.php [https://perma.cclQG6P-VJKP] (archived
Aug. 5, 2018).
EIGERT, supranote 4, at 2.
12.
See Poland Court Bill: President Proposes Compromise Move, BBC NEWS
13.
(July 18, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40647997 [https://perma.cc/FU
N6-YYEG] (archived Aug. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Poland Court Bill] (mentioning Duda's
proposed compromise for new bills).
See Poland Judiciary Reforms: Judge Accuses Government of Coup, BBC
14.
http://www.bbc.cominews/world-europe-42464007
2017),
23,
(Dec.
NEWS
[https://perma.cc/99RY-2WF4] (archived Aug. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Government Coup]
(noting the PiS Party passed the revised bills).
Id.
15.
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After Parliament passed the first reform bills, Polish citizens
staged mass protests 1 6 and the European Union (EU) condemned the
bills. 1 7 The EU strongly considered triggering Article 7 sanctions 1 8-a
previously unused mechanic.1 9 Article 7 is a two-step sanctions
process. 20 The first step provides that, with the approval of a four-fifths
majority of member nations, the EU will formally warn a nation that
there is a clear risk of a serious breach of EU values. 2 1 The second step
involves the imposition of sanctions, including the possibility of
stripping a nation's voting rights, but requires unanimous approval
from EU member states. 2 2 Hungary supports Poland and made it clear
it would oppose any sanctions, making it extremely difficult to impose
those sanctions. 2 3
The EU argued the proposed bills eliminated judicial
independence and threatened the rule of law in Poland. 2 4 As a result,
the EU claimed Poland also threatened the rule of law in all EU
member states. 25 The rule of law is listed under Article 2 as one of the
EU values referenced in and protected by Article 7.26 In response, the
PiS Party contended the current judicial nomination process failed to
provide any oversight of the judiciary, breeding corruption and
allowing ex-Communists to remain on the bench. 2 7 Further, the party's

16.
See Polish Protests as Government Rejects Court Ruling, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35793914 [https://perma.cc/HG69-A4KT]
(archived Aug. 5, 2018).
17.
See Poland Court Bill, supra note 13 (providing response to the bills from the
vice president of the European Commission).
18.
See, e.g., Eszter Zalan, EU Commission Readies Article 7 ProcedureAgainst
Poland (July
19,
2017,
3:55
PM),
https://euobserver.com/justice/138568
[https://perma.cc/8M7Y-FLYV] (archived Aug. 5, 2018) (providing comments from EU
officials about launching Article 7 procedures).
19.
Maria Fletcher, Article 7 sanctions: a legal expert explains the EU's 'nuclear
option' (July 28, 2017, 9:34 AM), http://theconversation.com/article-7-sanctions-a-legalexpert-explains-the-eus-nuclear-option-81724 [https://perma.ccl7VE6-9PPY] (archived
Aug. 5, 2018).
20.
Zalan, supra note 18.
21.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 7(1), Oct. 26,
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 [hereinafter TEU].
22.
Id. art. 7(2)-(3).
23.
See PolandCourt Reforms: EU Says It Is Launching Legal Action, BBC NEWS
(July 26, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-4073184 [https://perma.cc/TXZ9
-CBW7] (archived Aug. 5, 2018) ("Such a penalty, known as Article 7, requires the
agreement of all EU member states, and Hungary says it will back Poland.").
24.
Zalan, supra note 18.
25.
Id.
26.
See TEU, supra note 21, art. 2 ("The Union is founded on the values of respect
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human
rights.").
27.
Poland MPs Back Controversial JudiciaryBill, BBC NEWS (July 15, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40617406
[https://perma.cc/EEH5-SM4M]
(archived Aug. 5, 2018) [hereinafter PolandMPs].
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election campaign focused on reforming the judiciary. 28 Accordingly,
the party claimed the reforms were the result of a fair, necessary, and
29
democratic process.
Since the EU has never actually imposed sanctions for rule of law
violations, and therefore never had reason to define the rule of law, the
question remains whether Poland's reform bills in fact violated the rule
of law within the EU framework. Part II provides a more extensive
background of Poland's political history, judicial procedures, and the
PiS Party's reform bills. Part III analyzes the reform bills with respect
to Article 7, judicial independence, and the rule of law, while also
discussing standards for judicial independence throughout the EU.
Part IV explains why the much-proposed idea of imposing Article 7
sanctions against Poland is not feasible, or maybe even desirable, and
discusses alternate responses the EU can take against Poland, as well
as how the situation in Poland can serve as a warning to the judiciaries
in other nations.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Rise of the PiS Party
In the spring of 2010, Polish President Lech Kaczynski and
numerous other high-ranking Polish officials flew to Smolensk,
Russia. 3 0 The purpose of the trip was to attend an event marking the
70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre, in which the Soviet Union
31
executed approximately twenty-two thousand Polish nationals.
Military personnel and police officers comprised over half of the Katyn
victims, and the massacre served to weaken any possible Polish
32
insurrection.
President Kaczynski's airplane crashed on descent, killing all
33
President Kaczynski's identical twin
ninety-six people onboard.
brother, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, was not on the flight and therefore

Poland Court Bill, supra note 13.
28.
See Poland MPs, supra note 27 (providing comments from a PiS Party
29.
official); see also EKIERT, supra note 4, at 4 ("They claim just to fulfil their promises to
the majority of voters who elected them.").
Adam Easton, Smolensk Tragedy Continues to Haunt Poland, BBC NEWS
30.
(Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.bbc.comlnews/world-europe-35924688 [https://perma.cc/GP
3Y-M7HV] (archived Aug. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Smolensk Tragedy].
Guy Walters, The forest of nightmares: The truthabout the Katyn massacres31.
and why Britain turned a blind eye, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 16, 2010, 6:10 AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1266098/The-forest-nightmares-The-truth[https://perma.cc/Z59V-SCYH]
Katyn-massacres--Britain-turned-blind-eye.html
(archived Aug. 5, 2018).
Id.
32.
Smolensk Tragedy, supra note 30.
33.
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survived. 3 4 Kaczynski subsequently became chair of the PiS Party,
which the brothers had founded together. 35
Following the plane crash, Kaczynski attempted to take his
brother's former position, but his numerous presidential bids failed. 3 6
Kaczynski later changed his political strategy, choosing other PiS
Party members, Duda and Szydlo, to run for the positions of president
and prime minister instead of himself.3 7 Kaczynski's strategy proved
successful in 2015: Duda won the national election in May, and Szydlo
became prime minister following the parliamentary election in
October.3 8 During the parliamentary election, the PiS Party also won
a majority of seats in both houses of Parliament.3 9 In Poland, a party
must find a coalition partner-another party-to work alongside if it
does not win a sufficient number of seats in Parliament (the exact
number depends on how many other parties earn seats). 4 0 By winning
a true majority, the PiS Party is the first party to control the legislature
without a coalition partner. 4 1
With the president and prime minister being PiS Party members,
the party controlled the executive branch, and with a true majority of
seats in both houses of Parliament, the PiS Party controlled the
legislative branch. The PiS Party thus gained more control over the
Polish government than any other party since the fall of communism. 4 2
As a result, Kaczynski became the most powerful political figure
in Poland. 4 3 While Kaczynski is officially only one of 460 members of
Parliament, his position as the chair of the PiS Party has given him
nearly complete control over the Polish government since the 2015
elections. 4 4 The PiS Party is so leader centric that Kaczynski can expel
anyone he wants from the party. 4 5 In addition, it is unlikely anyone
expelled from the party will achieve success afterwards since no other
political party will embrace a former PiS Party member due to the

Id.
34.
35.
Id.
36.
Adam Easton, Poland Returns to Conservative Roots with Law and Justice
Win, BBC NEWS (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.bbc.cominews/world-europe-34640535
[https://perma.ccfP8EB-RSEY] (archived Aug. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Poland Returns to
ConservativeRoots].
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Rightwing Law and Justice Party, supra note 1.
40.
See Rick Lyman, Right-Wing Party Roars Back in Polish Elections, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/polandparliamentary-elections.html [https://perma.cc/8ELTL-SJ5V] (archived Aug. 5, 2018)
(discussing the outcome of the election).
41.
Rightwing Law and Justice Party, supra note 1.
42.
Id.
43.
See Poland Returns to Conservative Roots, supra note 36 (stating Kaczynski
will be making the important decisions in Poland in the coming years).
44.
EKIERT, supra note 4, at 7.
45.
Id. at 9.
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46
As a result, even the president
party's extreme stances and actions.
47
and prime minister normally listen to Kaczynski's orders.
After the 2015 elections, the PiS Party began stripping power from
48
One of the party's
anyone who posed a threat to the party's power.
49
first actions was to pass amendments significantly inhibiting the CT.
Because the party controlled the executive and legislative branches,
the CT served as one of the only independent checks on the PiS Party

within Poland. 5 0 The PiS Party refused to publish the CT's decisions,
increased the number of judges required to be present for the CT to
51
As
hold a hearing, and adjusted the CT's schedule of case hearings.
a result of the amendments, the tribunal has effectively become a pawn
52
of the PiS Party rather than an independent branch of government.
53
The PiS Party also launched an attack on the Polish media. The
party passed legislation allowing the executive branch to hire and fire
54
Since most Polish
the broadcasting chiefs of state-owned media.
55
controlling
citizens collect their news from state-owned sources,
those sources gives the PiS Party power over the information citizens
receive. Duda argued the laws created a more "impartial, objective, and
reliable" press that will promote Polish traditions and patriotic

46.
Id.
47.
Id.
See Matczak, supra note 9 (discussing the PiS Party's control over the
48.
Constitutional Tribunal and the new bills).
Alexis Wheeler, Poland Passes Controversial Law to Weaken Top Court,
49.
JURIST (Dec. 24, 2015, 3:29 PM), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2015/12/poland[https://perma.cc/EFN2-JSN7]
passes-controversial-law-to-weaken-top-court.php
(archived Aug. 5, 2018).
See Laura Smith-Spark, Antonia Mortensen & Paul P. Murphy, Protests Grow
50.
as Polish President Considers Judicial Bill, CNN (July 23, 2017, 3:15 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/2 1/europe/poland-judicial-bill-pass-upperhouse/index.html
[https://perma.ccl7ARA-CW4N] (archived Aug. 5, 2018) ("The move by the [PiS Party] to
control one of the last remaining independent government institutions has prompted
concern . . . '). Adam Bodnar, who serves as national Ombudsman and acts as an

independent watchdog of human rights and freedoms from within the government, is
perhaps the last government official still criticizing the PiS Party. See Adam Bodnar
19, 2015),
(Aug.
EUR. U.
elected as ombudsman for Poland, CENT.
https://legal.ceu.edularticle/2015-08- 19/adam-bodnar-elected-ombudsman-poland [https
://perma.cc/6U6E-PNGV] (archived Aug. 5, 2018).
51.
See Wheeler, supra note 49 (discussing the changes to the CT).
See Matczak, supra note 9 ("[T]he CT is now fully (and unlawfully) under
52.
PiS's control . . . .").
See Constance Johnson, Poland: Controversial Proposals and Measure on
53.
Surveillance Law, Constitutional Tribunal, and Media Law, LIBR. OF CONG. (Feb. 3,
2016), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/poland-controversial-proposals-andmeasures-on-surveillance-law-constitutional-tribunal-and-media-law/
[https://perma.cc/ZZ8R-62MW] (archived Aug. 5, 2018) (discussing numerous bills
passed by the PiS Party shortly after the election).
Id.
54.
Polish Media Laws: Government Takes Control of State Media, BBC NEWS
55.
(Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.bbc.cominews/world-europe-35257105 [https://perma.ccl8AC5
-ZX35] (archived Aug. 5, 2018).
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values. 5 6 The PiS Party also passed other controversial legislation,
such as bills increasing the ability of the government to conduct
surveillance of its own citizens5 7 and limiting the right to peacefully
assemble.5 8 However, the legislation receiving perhaps the most
international attention is those bills affecting the SC. 59
B. The CurrentPolish Judicial Structure
The reason the bills affecting the SC have garnered so much
attention is because of the important role the SC plays in day-to-day
legal matters in Poland. The SC acts as the court of last resort for
appeals of lower court decisions.6 0 It also supervises adjudication in
general and military courts throughout Poland, including civil law,
criminal law, labor law, social security and public affairs, and.issues
involving military members. 6 1 The. SC also confirms election results. 6 2
The number of justices on the SC at any time is capped at ninety, 6 3
and, before the reform bills, there were eighty-two sitting justices. 64
All judicial nominees for the SC must meet numerous
requirements 65 and be selected by the KRS. 6 6 Upon motion by the
KRS, the Polish president appoints the selected nominee to the SC. 6 7
Prior to the PiS Party's reform bills, the KRS consisted of the Minister
of Justice, four Sejm members, two senators, one presidential
appointee, the First President of the SC, the President of the Supreme
Administrative Court, and fifteen other judges selected by the
judiciary. 6 8 This means that SC nominees were selected by a KRS that

56.
Johnson, supra note 53.
57.
Id.
58.
Smith-Spark et al., supra note 50.
59.
See Zalan, supranote 18 (highlighting the intense reaction to the reforms bills
from the EU).
60.
ACT ON THE SUPREME COURT [SUP. CT. ACT] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1 (Pol.)
[hereinafter SUP. CT. ACT]
61.
Id. art. 1-3.
62.
Jan Cienski & Mala de la Baume, Brussels Warns Poland over Judicial
Reforms, POLITICO (July 19, 2017, 8:12 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-ruleof-law-constitution-brussels-warns-over-judicial-reforms/
[https://perma.cc/5N4QZU7B] (archived Aug. 5, 2018).
63.
Poland, NETWORK OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE SUP. CTS. OF THE EUR. UNION,
http://network-presidents.eulpage/poland-O
(last
visited
Oct.
28,
2017)
[https://perma.cc/3DMJ-LTG4] (archived Aug. 5, 2018).
64.
Rick Lyman, Poland'sPresident Offers New Path to End Court Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/worldleurope/polandcourts-andrzej-duda.html
[https://perma.cclW4S3-AGCQ] (archived Aug. 5, 2018)
[hereinafter Lyman, Poland's President].
65.
SUP. CT. ACT, supra note 60, art. 22.
66.
Id. art. 21.
67.
Id.
68.
ACT ON THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE JUDICIARY [KRS ACT] [CIVIL CODE]
art. 7-13 (Pol.).
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predominantly consisted of other members of the judiciary-fifteen of
69
the twenty-five members came from within the judiciary.
Prior to the reform bills, SC justices were granted tenure until
they reached the required retirement age of seventy, but they could
choose to retire early at either age sixty-five or sixty, depending on the
length of time they had served. 70 The KRS also nominates judges for
positions on the lower common courts across the country, who are then
appointed by the president. 7
C. The PiS Party'sReform Bills
On July 20, 2017, the PiS Party-dominated Parliament passed
three bills greatly increasing the ability of the executive and legislative
branches to control the judiciary. 7 2 The first bill changed the makeup
of the KRS, providing for a greater number of government appointees
on the council. 73 The bill increased the number of KRS members
appointed by Parliament from eight to fifteen.7 4 Changing the makeup
of the KRS provided politicians, to the exclusion of the judiciary, with
complete control over the appointment and promotion of SC justices
75
moving forward.
The second bill amended the Law on Common Courts, placing the
power to appoint the heads of the lower courts-the presidents and vice
76
The bill also
presidents-in the hands of the Minister of Justice.
changed the procedure by which judges are promoted, but failed to
77
In Poland, the Minister of
specify the criteria that will be used.
78
By
Justice simultaneously acts as the Prosecutor General.
reassigning control over the appointment and promotion procedures,
the bills allowed the Minister of Justice to choose the leaders of the

Amnesty Int'l, Poland: Three Amendments that Seriously Undermine the
69.
Independence of Judiciary, AI Index EUR 37/6753/2017 (July 18, 2017) [hereinafter
Amnesty Int'l].
SUP. CT. ACT, supra note 60, art. 30 §§ 1-2.
70.
Michal Fabisiak, How Judges are Selected Across Europe, RADIO POL. (July
71.
24, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/317562,How-judges-are-selectedacross-Europe [https://perma.cc/X7KJ-3TJG] (archived Aug. 20, 2018).
See Matczak, supra note 9 (explaining the effects of the bills on the judiciary).
72.
See Rick Lyman, Polish Parliament Approves Law Curtailing Courts'
73.
Independence, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/world/
europe/poland-courts-independence.html [https://perma.cc/4EE9-7DFY] (archived Aug.
20, 2018) [hereinafter Lyman, Polish Parliament](noting the change in structure of the
KRS).
Amnesty Int'l, supra note 69.
74.
Matczak, supra note 9.
75.
Amnesty Int'l, supra note 69.
76.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
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lower courts, while also being involved in those same courts'
proceedings in his role as the Prosecutor General.7 9
The third bill forced all of the current SC justices into immediate
retirement, while giving the Minister of Justice power to grant
exceptions and extend tenure to justices of his choosing.8 0 The Minister
of Justice could then pick replacements for all of the others.8 1 In
addition, the bill created a new role for the Minister of Justice within
the disciplinary proceedings for SC justices. 8 2 Moreover, the bill
allowed the Minister of Justice to retroactively question the decisions
of SC disciplinary proceedings that occurred before the bill took
effect. 8 3
As noted above, Duda vetoed two of these original reform bills but
subsequently signed revised bills that are mostly identical in their
effects: only 40 percent of the Supreme Court judges are forced into
retirement under the new bills, but the composition of the KRS was
still changed to effectively give the PiS Party control over the
nomination and appointment of judges. 84
D. The PiS Party's Justificationfor the Reform Bills
In order to understand the PiS Party's justifications for these bills,
it is helpful to know some of Poland's post-communism history. In the
years immediately following the collapse of communism in 1989, in
order to encourage national reconciliation, Poland made no official
attempts at restricting the participation of former communists in the
new government. 8 5 But in 1997, a right-wing party proposed a
"lustration" bill which provided that high-ranking officials in all three
branches of government, as well as state media, must file affidavits
declaring whether they had ever been communist agents. 8 6 Before the
bill was passed, the president at the time-reformed communist
Aleksander Kwagniewski-amended it in such a manner that most
former communists could easily avoid detection. 8 7 The Parliament
passed a revised lustration bill the following year that reduced former
communists' ability to avoid detection and expanded the bill's scope to
cover private attorneys as well.8 8 Under the expanded bill, more
lawyers were found to have lied on their affidavits than members of

79.
Id.
80.
Lyman, Polish Parliament, supra note 73.
81.
Id.
82.
Amnesty Int'l, supra note 69.
83.
Id.
84.
See Government Coup, supranote 14.
85.
AVIEZER TUCKER, THE LEGACIES OF TOTALITARIANISM: A THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK 113 (2015).
86.
Id.
87.
Id. at 113-14.
88.
Id. at 114.
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any other profession.8 9 However, over a span of seven years, the
90
lustration bill only uncovered a total of 277 former communists.
The Kaczynski brothers long abhorred communism: their father
took part in the Warsaw Uprising during World War II,91 Lech served
six months in a communist internment camp for his role in dissident
politics, and Jaroslaw remains insistent that communists maintained
92
control of Poland through the post-1989 transformation. After Lech
Kaczynski became president, the PiS Party attempted to enforce a
more sweeping lustration law in 2006.93 The new lustration law
required all public officials, legal professionals, academics, and
members of the media to submit affidavits concerning any past
collaboration with communists. 94 Anyone found to have lied on their
affidavit could be banned from holding another position covered by the
lustration law for ten years. 95 However, the CT declared the PiS
Party's law unconstitutional and excluded nongovernment employees
from its scope. 9 6 The CT also removed the ten-year ban on holding
7
other positions, making the law essentially toothless.9 The PiS Party
complained that the CT was composed of judges appointed either
98
In short, the
before 1989 or by a former communist-Kwainiewski.
Kaczynskis desired to remove what they considered the older
generation of elites and replace them with their own loyalists, but their
efforts were impeded by a CT comprised of members of that older
generation of elites.9
Kaczynski's arguments for the new judicial reform bills are
reminiscent of his arguments for the lustration law, as well as
reflective of his distaste for the judges who impeded lustration:
Kaczynski claims that too many of the country's current judges are
holdovers from its communist past, favoring global interests over

Id.
89.
Id.
90.
91.
Jaroslaw Adamowski, Lech Kaczynski Obituary, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 11,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/11/lech-kaczynski1:33 PM),
2010,
obituary [https://perma.cc/PLE4-Z27T] (archived Aug. 20, 2018).
Jan Cienski, Poland's 'powerholic', POLITICO (July 8, 2016, 5:30 AM),
92.
https://www.politico.eu/article/polands-powerholic-jaroslaw-kaczynski-warsaw-law-andjustice-party-pis/ [https://perma.cc/37GH-WKZJ] (archived Aug. 20, 2018) (discussing
the Kaczynski's childhood and ascension to politics).
TUCKER, supra note 85, at 114.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Id. at 115.
98.
See Valentinas Mite, Poland: Tough Lustration Law Divides Society, RADIO
99.
FREE EuROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 23, 2007, 3:16 PM), https://www.rferl.org/a/107547
1.html [https://perma.cc[RZC3-FDF3] (archived Aug. 20, 2018) (positing why the
Kaczynskis resent older politicians).
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national needs,1 0 0 and as a result are not responsive to the public
because they were not appointed by any elected official. 1 0 1 The PiS
Party contends the reform bills were necessary in order to make the
judicial system more efficient, 10 2 effective, and less corrupt. 10 3 The
party asserts that, as it stood, the judicial branch only served the
elite. 1 04 Also, the PiS Party argues the previous judicial appointment
procedures were undemocratic. 1 05 The Minister of Justice praised the
bills as ending "corporatism," introducing "the oxygen of democracy,"
and ending "court-ocracy." 10 6 Polish officials and the state-run media
also argued the reforms would result in a judicial system comparable
to others in the EU. 0 7 Poland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued the
bills sought "only to regain the citizens' respect for the judiciary." 108
Moreover, the PiS Party argues the bills were the result of a
legitimate and democratic process. 10 9 Public opinion polls show that
over 60 percent of Poles favored judicial reform. 11 0 The PiS Party ran
on a platform promising to reform the courts.1 1 1 As a result, the party
claims the bills were the result of a democratic process and that the
party was simply responding to popular will. 1 12
E. Domestic and InternationalResponses to the Reform Bills
Despite the PiS Party's claims that the reform bills resulted from
a democratic process, massive protests erupted in Warsaw, Krakow,

100. Lyman, Polish Parliament, supra note 73.
101. Polishjustice system 'deeply flawed': new PM, RADIO POL. (Dec. 13, 2017,2:28
PM), http://www.thenews.pl/l/2/Artykul/339665,Polish-justice-system-%E2%80%98dee
ply-flawed%E2%80%99-new-PM [https://perma.cc/345X-FKTU] (archived Aug. 20, 2018)
(arguing judges are either holdovers from the communist era or were appointed by other
judges, leading to corrupt behavior).
102. James Shotter & Evon Huber, PolandSenate Passes Contested JudiciaryBill,
FIN. TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/8ddc360a-6eOd-11e7-b9c715af748b60d0 [https://perma.ccl5Z6H-XQMR] (archived Aug. 20, 2018).
103. Poland Court Bill: Parliament Votes for JudicialReforms, BBC NEWS (July
20, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40670790 [https://perma.cc/8WMYZ473] (archived Aug. 20, 2018) [hereinafter ParliamentVotes].
104. Poland MPs, supra note 27.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Smith-Spark et al., supra note 50 (providing comments from PiS Party
officials claiming Poland must change to achieve the EU standards in terms of democracy
and the rule of law); see also Fabisiak, supra note 71 (comparing the reform bills to the
judicial systems of other EU member states).
108. Smith-Spark et al., supra note 50.
109. EKIERT, supra note 4, at 4.
110. ParliamentVotes, supranote 103.
111. Id.; EKIERT, supra note 4, at 4.
112. EIERT, supra note 4, at 4.
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113
and Katowice after the Parliament passed the initial bills.
1 4
Protesters decried the bills as destroying judicial independencel and
1 15
While over 60 percent of Poles
called for Duda to veto the bills.
favored some manner of judicial reform, many felt the bills went too
far. 1 16 After Parliament passed the bills, a new public opinion poll
showed that 55 percent of Poles believed Duda should veto the bills,
while only 29 percent said he should not.11 7 Another poll reported that
1 18
76 percent of Poles opposed a politicized judiciary.
The leaders of the largest opposition parties, the Civic Platform
1 19
Grzegorz
and the Modern Party, joined the protesters in Warsaw.
Schetyna, the leader of the Civic Platform, called for the parties to
0
work together to fight the PiS Party's legislation. 12 Schetnya referred
to the Parliament's passage of the bills as "the day judicial
independence died." 1 2 1 The leaders expressed concern that the PiS
Party's control over judicial appointments under the bills violates the
constitutional separation of powers. 12 2 Pawel Kukiz, the leader of
another opposition party, argued that the bills failed to reform the
12 3
A general
judiciary and instead just changed the personnel.
criticism from opposition groups has been that the PiS Party is simply
attempting to subvert the rule of law by taking control of the
124

judiciary.
12 5
Foreign nations also immediately responded to the reform bills.
Shortly after Parliament approved the bills, the U.S. State Department
urged the Polish government to "ensure that any judicial reform does
not violate Poland's constitution or international legal obligations and
respects the principles of judicial independence and separation of

113. Poles Rally Against ControversialReform of Judiciary, BBC NEWS (July 16,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40622896 [https://perma.ccJ8WW-XCX
V] (archived Aug. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Poles Rally].
114. Id.
115. ParliamentVotes, supra note 103.
116. Id.
117. Smith-Spark et al., supra note 50.
118. Tara John, Why Poland's Government Is Being Accused of Destroying
Democracy, TIME (July 21, 2017), http://time.com/4868023/poland-judiciary-democracythreat/ [https://perma.cc/57PF-E59H] (archived Aug. 20, 2018).
119. See Poles Rally, supra note 113 (noting speakers from those parties spoke at
the Warsaw rally).
120. Id.
121. ParliamentVotes, supra note 103.
122. See Poles Rally, supra note 113 ("The opposition fear the law will give
parliament - dominated by PiS lawmakers - indirect control over judicial appointments,
violating the constitutional separation of powers.").
123. ParliamentVotes, supra note 103.
124. See Lyman, Poland's President, supra note 64 ("Domestic opponents and
European Union officials have accused them of trying to subvert the rule of law by
placing the courts more firmly under the control of the right-wing ruling party.").
125. See, e.g., EKIERT, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing responses from foreign
nations).
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powers." 1 26 Many nations within the EU condemned the bills. For
example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stressed that the reform
bills seriously threaten the rule of law-a principle necessary for
cooperation within the EU.1 27 Likewise, French President Emmanuel
Macron criticized the bills as a threat to the EU's democratic values. 12 8
Luxembourg's Minister of Foreign Affairs questioned whether Poland
should remain in the EU, stating "we cannot work with countries that
violate fundamental values." 1 29 Other EU nations, such as Slovakia
and the Czech Republic, offered more restrained criticism. 130
Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico maintained a neutral tone about
Poland's actions, but simultaneously stressed his country's need to be
"close to the [EU] core, close to France, close to Germany."131
The European Commission (EC)-the EU institution responsible
for upholding its treaties and general interests-heavily criticized not
only the recent reform bills, but also many of the other actions the PiS
Party has taken since gaining power. Following the PiS Party's
passage of the restrictive media laws, the EC expressed concern that
they conflicted with the EU's rules on media freedom. 13 2 After the PiS
Party's amendments to the CT, the EC opened dialogue with the party
over concerns that the amendments subverted the rule of law. 1 33
However, the EC's criticism of the PiS Party increased after the recent
reform bills. 13 4 Frans Timmerman, the vice president of the EC,
explained that adopting the bills "would abolish any remaining judicial
independence and put the judiciary under full political control." 1 35
Timmerman stressed that the threat to the rule of law in Poland
threatens every EU member state because upholding EU law becomes

126. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of St., Poland: Independence of the Judiciary (July
21, 2017), https://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2017/07/272791.htm [https://perma.cc/ZV73
-V787] (archived Aug. 20, 2018).
127. Jennifer Rankin, Angela Merkel: we cannot hold our tongues on risk to rule of
law in Poland, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2017, 9:58 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/aug/29/angela-merkel-poland-judicial-reforms-courts [https://perma.cclRJ3B
-TW43] (archived Aug. 20, 2018).
128. Id.
129. EKIERT, supra note 4, at 3.
130. Rankin, supra note 127.
131. Id.
132. Ram Eachambadi, European Commission to review Poland media law,
JURIST (Jan. 3, 2016, 1:29 PM), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2016/01/europeancommission-to-review-poland-media-law.php [https://perma.cclKJ3W-D95P] (archived
Aug. 20, 2018).
133. Johnson, supra note 53.
134. See Zalan, supra note 18 ("These laws considerably increase the threat to the
rule of law in Poland.").
135. Id.
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unreliable. 13 6 Accordingly, Timmerman confirmed the EC is
13 7
considering triggering Article 7 in hopes of sanctioning Poland.
Hungarian President Victor Orban remains Poland's strongest
13 8
Orban's support is understandable considering Orban's
ally.
government similarly garnered criticism from other EU nations for its
own attempt at purging its nation's judiciary in 2013.139 Orban
subsequently changed his country's election laws in order to retain his
power. 14 0 Following the criticism about Poland's reform bills from
other EU nations, Orban asserted Hungary's intention to "use all legal
options" within the EU to support Poland. 14 1 Hungary's Foreign
Minister reiterated this stance in a warning to the EC not to act like a
political body: "We stand by Poland, and we call on the [EC] not to
overstep its authority." 14 2 In short, Hungary will not vote for any EU
sanctions against Poland.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Article 7 Sanction Requirements
The EU introduced Article 7 to the Treaty of the European Union
(TEU) in 1999.143 At the time, the EU was preparing to add eight
14 4
Fear over the
formerly communist countries as new member states.
new members' political instability spurred the EU to create Article 7
14 5
Article 7 also
as an outline of the EU's core principles and values.
included a list of consequences, including the suspension of voting
14 6
The values protected by
rights, for the violation of those values.
14 7
The values protected
TEU.
the
2
of
Article 7 are presented in Article
are "respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule
14 8
of law and respect for human rights."

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Smith-Spark et al., supranote 50 (singling out Hungary as Poland's supporter
within the EU).
139. EKIERT, supra note 4, at 7.
140. Id. at 6.
141. Smith-Spark et al., supra note 50.
142. Parliament Votes, supra note 103.
143. Fletcher, supra note 19.
144. Id.
145. See Grdinne Burca, The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global
Human Rights Actor, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 649, 689-90 (2011) (discussing why the EU
adopted Article 7); see also Fletcher, supra note 19 (discussing the enlargement of the
EU and adoption of Article 7).
146. Id.
147. Fletcher, supra note 19.
148. TEU, supra note 21, art. 2.
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Shortly after Article 7 was created, the far-right Austrian
Freedom Party, and its leader Jorg Haider, won enough votes to be
included in a coalition Austrian government. 14 9 The EU responded
with symbolic sanctions, but Austria retained its voting rights. 1 50 The
Austrian public, meanwhile, perceived the EU as a bully for placing
sanctions on their country when it followed parliamentary procedures,
and Haider remained popular. 1 5 1
The "Haider affair" led to a revision of Article 7 in the Treaty of
Nice in 2001.152 The EU desired a more preemptive way to intervene
in future breaches of EU values.1 5 3 The revisions created an extra
warning stage for member states before the imposition of sanctions,
turning Article 7 into a two-step process. 15 4 Article 7 is initiated by the
European Council (Council), an EU institution that defines the EU's
political direction and consists of the heads of state of each member
state, the Council President, and the EC President.1 5 5 The first step,
the warning stage, requires that four-fifths of Council members
consent to a finding that there is a "clear risk of a serious breach" of
EU values by a member state. 1 56 At that point, the member state is
warned of the risk and, following the same procedure, the Council may
provide recommendations to the member state on how to remedy the
issue.1 5 7
The second step, the sanctioning stage, requires the Council
members' unanimous agreement that a member state is committing a
"serious and persistent breach" of EU values.1 5 8 The Council may
impose sanctions of its choosing, with the most severe punishment
considered being the suspension of a member state's voting rights on
the Council.1 5 9 After the Haider affair, the new Article 7 procedure has
never been used, partly due to fear of the political consequences that
may follow. 160 Since unanimous support from the Council is required,

149. Fletcher, supranote 19 (explaining why the EU subsequently modified Article
7 procedures).
150. Policing the Club: What Can the EU Do to punish Poland?, THE ECONOMIST
(July 27, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/europe/2 1725570-its-options-arelimited-what-can-eu-do-punish-poland [https://perma.cclMH3E-UW7M] (archived Aug.
20, 2018) [hereinafter Policing the Club].
151. See EKIERT, supra note 4, at 7 (explaining why sanctions did not work against
Austria); see also Policing the Club, supra note 150 ("[The EU] did impose some (mostly
symbolic) sanctions. They didn't work, and Mr Haider remained popular.").
152. Fletcher, supra note 19.
153. Id.
154. Policing the Club, supranote 150.
155. Fletcher, supra note 19.
156. TEU, supra note 21, art. 7(1).
157. Id.
158. Id. art. 7(2).
159. Id. art. 7(3).
160. See Fletcher, supra note 19 (explaining why Article 7 has never been
triggered).
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President Orban's support of the PiS Party presents a substantial
obstacle to the use of Article 7 procedures against Poland.
B. Defining the Rule of Law
In order for Article 7 sanctions to even be a possibility, however,
Poland must breach the values listed in Article 2. Article 2 of the TEU
lists the rule of law as one of the EU values that Article 7 was created
to protect. 16 1 Therefore, in order to know when Article 7 sanctions may
be triggered, it is necessary to look first at the meaning of the rule of
law as used in the TEU. Early jurisprudence of the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) on the rule of law focused on "principles of legality, legal
certainty, confidence in the stability of a legal situation, and
proportionality." 16 2 The ECJ also recognized procedural guarantees
inherent in the rule of law-such as the right to be heard and the right
16 3
of defense, among others.
However, despite the rule of law being listed amongst the values
on which the EU is founded, and the jurisprudence of the ECJ, scholars
have not adopted a single definition for the term. 164 For instance,
Professor Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono has analyzed the history and
165
understanding of the rule of law in different areas of the world.
Gosalbo-Bono argues that any attempt at a universal rule of law
requires four main principles: that power may not be exercised
arbitrarily, that there is supremacy of the law, that the law must apply
equally to all persons, and that there is respect for internationally
established human rights. 16 6 Professor Thomas von Danwitz,
meanwhile, argues that the rule of law is a living instrument, such that
it changes as society evolves with new economic, social, technological,
and political influences. 16 7 Professors Julio Rios-Figueroa and Jeffrey
K. Staton suggest the rule of law involves three dimensions: an
institutional dimension (considering governmental arbitrariness), an
individual dimension (considering the prevention of discrimination in

161. TEU, supranote 21, art. 2.
162. Thomas von Danwitz, The Rule of Law in the Recent Jurisprudence of the
ECJ, 37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1311, 1314 (2014).
163. Id. at 1316.
164. Julio Rios-Figueroa & Jeffrey K. Staton, Unpacking the Rule of Law: A Review
of Judicial Independence Measures 3 (CELS 2009 4th Ann. Conf. on Empirical Legal
Studies Paper, Apr. 26, 2009) ("Scholars do not share a definition of the rule of law at a
level of precision clear enough to suggest specific measurement strategies."); see also
Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, The Significance of the Rule of Law and its Implications for the
European Union and the United States, 72 U. PrrT. L. REV. 229, 231 (stating there is no
universal agreement about what the rule of law means).
165. See generally Gosalbo-Bono, supra note 164 (comparing definitions for the
rule of law in different regions of the world and under different legal regimes).
166. Id. at 290, 296.
167. Von Danwitz, supra note 162, at 1346.
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law enforcement), and a social dimension (considering how instability
and violence in a society may threaten the rule of law). 1 68
Dariusz Zawistowski, the chairman of the KRS and a justice on
the SC, states that the rule of law is founded on the concept that no
person is above the law. 169 Zawistowski notes that the rule of law was
conceived during the Enlightenment as a response to the prevailing
system at the time-absolute monarchy.1 7 0 The rule of law at that time
required constitutionalism, separation of powers, and judicial
independence, among other elements.1 7 1 As society's interests evolved,
new elements were added to the concept, such as the existence of
guarantees of civil rights.1 72
While Zawistowski acknowledges that scholars differ on some of
the elements for rule of law in the present day, he also states "it is
beyond doubt that the independence of the courts and judicial
independence are the foundations of the rule of law." 17 3 Similarly,
Gosalbo-Bono identifies an independent judiciary as an important
element for the principle of supremacy of the law, explaining that a
separation of powers and an independent judiciary are necessary for
the equal application of the law to specific cases. 1 74 Rios-Figueroa and
Staton likewise note that judicial independence is a critical component
of the institutional dimension of the rule of law. 1 75 Therefore, while
scholars may not agree on a single all-encompassing definition for the
rule of law, judicial independence appears to be generally accepted as
a required element in proffered definitions.
C. Defining JudicialIndependence
If judicial independence is accepted as a requirement in any
understanding of the rule of law, then a threat to judicial independence
in Poland would appear to provide the EU with a basis for Article 7
sanctions. However, as with the rule of law, there are differing
scholarly opinions on how to define and analyze judicial
independence.1 7 6 Some scholars even argue that attempting to create

168. Rios-Figueroa & Staton, supra note 164, at 7-9.
169. Dariusz Zawistowski, The Independence of the Courts and Judicial
Independence from the European Union Law Perspective, in RUCH PRAWNICZY
EKONOMICZNY I SoJoLOGIczNY 7, 7 (2016).
170. Id. at 8.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 8-9.
173. Id. at 9.
174. See Gosalbo-Bono, supranote 164, at 288 ('The independence of the law,
ensured by an independent judiciary, allows effective control of the arbitrary state and
guarantees a formal equality of citizens before the law.").
175. Rios-Figueroa & Staton, supra note 164, at 5.
176. Charles Gardner Geyh, JudicialIndependence as an OrganizingPrinciple, 10
ANN. REV. L. Soc. SCI. 185, 186 (2014).
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a single definition of judicial independence is futile because its
meaning will inevitably vary when considered within different theories
of adjudication. 1 7 7 However, surveying different approaches to
understanding judicial independence still provides a useful setting in
which to consider how Poland's recent reform bills affect its judiciary's
independence.
1. Balancing Independence and Accountability
Professor Charles Gardner Geyh recently proposed a useful
17 8
Much of his
framework for conceptualizing judicial independence.
analysis focuses on the US judiciary, but his framework is applicable
to other countries as well. 17 9 Geyh first explains that, in the past,
society generally believed judges simply followed the law when making
decisions. 18 0 In other words, so long as judges remain completely
independent from outside influences, they will set aside their own
ideological beliefs and impartially apply the law to the facts when
making their decisions.1 8 1 Geyh refers to this framework as the "rule
of law" paradigm.1 8 2 However, Geyh argues society's belief in that
18 3
paradigm is slowly eroding.
After arguing that the rule of law paradigm is eroding, Geyh
1 84
The legal
proposes a new "legal culture" paradigm to take its place.
legal
yet
seriously,
law
take
judges
culture paradigm posits that
and
inevitable
influences
extralegal
renders
indeterminacy
18 5
In other words, the paradigm accepts that there are
necessary.
situations in which a judge's life experiences are going to influence his
or her decision because there are cases where applying the law to the
facts still results in more than one possible, and acceptable, outcome
1 86
and a judgment call is required.
Meanwhile, Geyh notes that judicial independence is meant to
buffer judges from external pressures that may interfere with what he
proposes are judges' main responsibilities-upholding substantive law,
respecting parties' procedural rights for a fair hearing, and reaching a

177. Id.
178. See generally CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, COURTING PERIL: THE POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY (2016) (proposing a new framework for
considering ideas involving judicial independence).
179. See generally id. (focusing on developments of the public perception of the US
judiciary).
180. Id. at 1-44.
181. Id. at 2.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 44-76.
184. Id. at 76-101.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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just result in each specific case. 1 8 7 However, complete judicial
independence may allow judges to pursue their own private
agendas.1 8 8 Therefore, independence and accountability are both
required in order to ensure judges fulfill their responsibilities.1 8 9
In light of the need to balance independence and accountability,
Geyh argues there are three perspectives that must be considered: (1)
an adjudicative dimension, recognizing that parties desire a judge who
affords them a fair hearing; (2) an ethical dimension, recognizing that
judges seek to act honorably according to legal norms; and (3) a
political dimension, recognizing that the general public seeks judges it
can trust. 190 All three dimensions must be considered to maintain
sufficient judicial independence. 1 9 1 Geyh explains that too much
regulation in the political dimension, which could be useful for making
the judiciary more responsive to public preferences, could jeopardize
either the adjudicative dimension, by creating a risk that litigants will
not receive a fair hearing, or the ethical dimension, by compromising
the integrity of the judicial role. 19 2
2. De Jure and De Facto Independence
Another framework for analyzing judicial independence, used by
numerous scholars, differentiates between de jure independence and
de facto independence.1 9 3 De jure independence refers to the level of
independence granted by the actual law. 194 In other words, de jure
independence is concerned with the formal rules in place that are
meant to protect the judiciary from undue influence. De facto
independence, on the other hand, refers to the level of independence
that judges actually enjoy. 19 5 This framework acknowledges that it is
possible for a country's government to respect the judiciary's
independence without having formal laws protecting it, while another
country's government may ignore formal grants of independence and,
in reality, heavily regulate or restrict the judiciary.1 96

187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 101-26.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 159.
193. See, e.g., Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial
Independence: Cross-Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators, 19 EUR. J. POL.
ECON. 497, 498 (2003) (distinguishing de jure and de facto judicial independence).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Stefan Voigt, Jerg Gutmann & Lars P. Feld, Economic Growth and Judicial
Independence, a Dozen Years On: Cross-Country Evidence Using an Updated Set of
Indicators, 38 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 197, 200 (2015).
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There have been numerous attempts to provide measures for both
de jure and de facto independence. In their work comparing judicial
independence and economic growth, Professors Lars P. Feld and Stefan
Voigt looked at twelve factors as a measure of de jure independence in
a given country. These factors included: (1) whether the highest court
is anchored in the constitution; (2) how difficult it is to amend the
constitution; (3) appointment procedures; (4) term lengths; (5) whether
terms are renewable; (6) how judges can be removed from office; (7)
whether judicial salaries can be changed by other branches of
government; (8) whether judicial salaries are adequate; (9) court
accessibility; (10) case allocation; (11) whether there is constitutional
197
When
review; and (12) whether court decisions are published.
analyzing these factors, Feld and Voigt only considered actual legal
documents to see what the law of the country had established. 198
For an indicator of de facto judicial independence, Feld and Voigt
considered eight variables: (1) the term lengths actually enjoyed by
judges; (2) whether that term length is shorter than the length
promised in legal documents; (3) whether judges are removed before
the end of a term; (4) how often the number of judges changes; (5)
whether salaries remain constant in reality; (6) the court's budget as
an organization (including number of clerks employed, size of the
library, etc.); (7) changes to the legal foundation of the highest court;
and (8) whether the government actually enforces the court's
decisions.1 9 9 For both the de jure and de facto measures, Feld and Voigt
20 0
contend that the variables they use are as objective as possible.
D. The European Union's JudicialIndependence Norms
Having established variables for measuring both de jure and de
facto independence, Feld and Voigt then analyzed the judicial
independence of numerous countries-sixty-six in their initial study
from 2003,201 and 118 in a subsequent study conducted in 2015.202 In
the initial study, Poland's de jure independence score ranked eleventh
2 03
out of the twenty-five EU member states with data available.
Unfortunately, Poland's de facto independence data was not available
in the initial study. 2 04 In the subsequent study, Poland's de jure
independence score ranked only twenty-fifth out of the twenty-seven

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 204-06.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 206-07.
Id. at 199.
Feld & Voigt, supra note 193, at 498.
Voigt et al., supra note 196, at 201.
Feld & Voigt, supra note 193, at 523-24.
Id. at 525-26.
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EU member states with data available. 20 5 However, this information
does not reveal data about the individual factors of the Polish judiciary
that Feld and Voigt considered, and it also does not include the most
recent reform bills that the EU is concerned about.
The EU Justice Scoreboard, on the other hand, provides yearly
data on specific aspects of EU member states' judicial systems. Some
of the variables that are considered in Feld and Voigt's calculations of
judicial
independence-such
as
resources
and
structural
independence-are included in the EU Justice Scoreboard. 2 0 6 Other
factors that are not considered by Feld and Voigt, but that are relevant
to an analysis of judicial independence and accountability in Geyh's
legal culture paradigm-such as perceived judicial independence and
judicial training-are also included in the EU Justice Scoreboard. 2 07
1. Judicial Resources
According to the EU Justice Scoreboard, Poland's courts actually
receive a fair amount of resources from the government. 2 0 8 In 2015,
Poland ranked sixteenth in the EU for euros budgeted to the courts per
inhabitant, 2 0 9 but when considered as a percentage of gross domestic
product, Poland ranked second in the EU for government expenditure
on the courts. 21 0 At the same time, though, it is the executive branch
that is in charge of determining the financial resources allocated for
the judiciary in Poland. 2 1 1 There may be concerns that an executive
that controls the judiciary's budget could potentially harm judicial
independence in Geyh's adjudicative and ethical dimensions. The EU
Justice Scoreboard shows, however, that this executive power is fairly
standard in the EU-nineteen other member states share this
characteristic. 2 12
2. Efficiency of the Judiciary
One of the PiS Party's justifications for its reform bills is that the
Polish judiciary was inefficient. 2 13 In an opinion poll conducted in

205. Voigt et al., supra note 196, at 210.
206. JUSTICE AND CONSUMERS, THE 2017 EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD 25, 40 (2017)
[hereinafter JUSTICE SCOREBOARD).
207. Id. at 28-29, 37.
208. See id. at 25-26 (ranking EU member states in order of government
expenditure on courts).
209. Id. at 25.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 26.
212. Id.
213. See Shotter & Huber, supra note 102 (stating the PiS Party believes changes
are necessary to fix an inefficient system); see also Anna Matczak, JudicialReforms in
Poland-Gettingthe Public on Board, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. & POL. SCI. (July 26, 2017),
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March 2017, the most frequent criticism of the Polish judiciary was the
long duration of court procedures. 2 14 Forty-eight percent of
respondents complained about the long duration of court procedures
21 5
and 15 percent complained about frequent delays in deciding cases.
21 6
The EU Justice Scoreboard, however, contradicts this sentiment.
Although the most recent data on Poland is from 2014, information
from that year shows Poland ranked fourth-best in the EU in terms of
the time needed to resolve civil, commercial, and administrative
cases.2 1 7 In nearly all of the measurements of efficiency considered,
Poland ranks in the top half of the EU. 218 On the other hand, the data
does show Poland has room to improve in the efficient adjudication of
2 19
consumer protection cases and communications-rules violations.
Still, the data demonstrates a disconnect between the justification of
the PiS Party for the reform bills22 0-seemingly accepted by the Polish
public 2 21-and reality.
3. Appointment Procedures
When it comes to the appointment procedures, the vast majority
of EU member states rely on a Council for the Judiciary, or some other
222
Latvia is
independent body, to nominate judges for appointment.
the only EU member state that allows an executive to unilaterally
nominate a judge for appointment, and even then, the Latvian
22 3
Parliament must approve of the nomination and appoint the judge.
The only member states that allow the same entity to both nominate
and appoint judges are Greece, Italy, and Portugal, and in those
countries it is the Council for the Judiciary that makes the

http://blogs.1se.ac.ukleuroppblog/2017/07/26/judicial-reforms-in-poland-getting-thepublic-on-board/ [https://perma.cc/NR9K-R3BK] (archived July 31, 2018) (providing
justifications offered by the PiS Party for judicial reform).
214.

CBOS PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, EVALUATION OF THE JUDICIARY 3-

4 (2017), http://www.cbos.pl/EN/publications/reports/2017/031-17.pdf [https://perma.ce
/C24S-YMJX] (archived Aug. 1, 2018) [hereinafter EVALUATION OF THE JUDICIARY].
215. Id. at 4.
216. See JUSTICE SCOREBOARD, supra note 206, at 7-17 (ranking EU member
states on judicial efficiency in different types of cases).
217. Id. at 7.
218. See id. at 7-16 (including rankings for efficiency in resolving cases involving
domestic law as well as cases involving EU law).
219. See id. at 14-15 (ranking Poland near the bottom of the EU in efficiency for
these types of cases).
220. See Shotter & Huber, supra note 102 (justifying the reform bills because of
judicial inefficiency).
221. See EVALUATION OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 214, at 3-4 (showing the
public views the judiciary as inefficient).
222. See JUSTICE SCOREBOARD, supra note 206, at 40 (analyzing the nomination
and appointment procedures for each EU member state).
223. Id.
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nominations and appointments. 2 24 In other words, no EU member
state allows either the legislative or judicial branches to unilaterally
nominate and appoint judges. 2 2 5
The EU Justice Scoreboard shows Poland's appointment
procedures as including an initial exam or competition to become a
judge that is then followed by a nomination by an independent bodythe KRS. 2 2 6 The nomination is then followed by an official
appointment by the executive branch. 2 27 If the executive chooses not
to appoint the nominated judge, the executive can only choose a
replacement from among the other proposed candidates. 22 8 The EU
Justice Scoreboard lists three member states as allowing the executive
to reject a nomination and instead appoint any. other candidate:
Ireland, Sweden, and the Czech Republic. 2 29 However, in practice, this
is not true. Ireland always appoints one of the proposed candidates and
Sweden requires the executive to seek a new opinion by the nomination
board if the executive wants to appoint a different candidate. 2 30 In the
Czech Republic, while judges are appointed by the president, they must
complete extensive training within the courts. 2 3 1
The PiS Party's reform bills changed the appointment procedures
in Poland. Under the bills, the heads of the lower courts are all
nominated and appointed by a member of the executive branch: the
Minister of Justice. 2 32 The SC judges are still nominated by the KRS
and appointed by the executive. 2 3 3 However, the KRS-formerly
considered an independent body-has been reconfigured to effectively
give control over the nomination process to the legislative and
executive branches. 2 34 As a result, the bills provide the PiS Party with
exclusive control over judicial nominations and appointments, 2 3 5
distinguishing Poland's system from that of every other EU member
state. 2 36

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 41.
229. Id.
230. See id. (noting actual practice in individual member states).
231. Michal Bobek, Update:An Introduction to the Czech Legal System and Legal
Resources Online, N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW HAUSER GLOB. LAW ScH. PROGRAM (July 2018),
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/CzechRepublicl.html
[https://perma.cclEUQ777R4] (archived Aug. 1, 2018).
232. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 69.
233. Lyman, Poland'sPresident,supra note 64.
234. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 69 (discussing the reconfiguration of the KRS).
235. Matczak, supra note 9.
236. See JUSTICE SCOREBOARD, supranote 206, at 40-41 (outlining the nomination
and appointment procedures in each EU member state).
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4. Removal from Office
The procedures for removing judges vary widely between the
different EU member states, but nearly all of them either provide for a
review of a dismissal decision before a court or other independent body
or place the final decision in the hands of the judiciary. 23 7 Malta places
the final decision in the hands of Parliament, but the Parliament may
23 8
only act upon a proposal for removal by an independent body.
Ireland is unique among EU member states by permitting removal
23 9
without the involvement of the judiciary or other independent body.
Ireland permits removal by resolution from both houses of the
legislature. 24 0 However, in practice, no judge has ever been removed
24 1
from office in Ireland.
Prior to the reform bills, Poland's SC judges were granted tenure
until the age of seventy. 24 2 However, after the reforms, 40 percent of
the SC judges were immediately forced into retirement, with the
2 43
Minister of Justice given discretion over allowing them to continue.
Aside from the fact that this bill likely violated the Polish
constitution 2 44 and ECJ case law, 245 it also placed Poland at odds with
24 6
the removal procedures of the other EU member states.

237. See id. at 43 (outlining the removal procedures in each EU member state).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See Removal from Judicial Office, ASSN OF JUDGES OF IRELAND,
(last visited Mar. 1, 2018)
https://aji.ie/the-judiciary/removal-from-judicial-office/
[https://perma.cclP5SS-Q5X6] (archived Aug. 1, 2018) (noting that the president must be
notified of these resolutions).
241. Id.
242. See SUP. CT. ACT, supra note 60, art. 30 §§ 1-2 (stating tenure and retirement
rules).
243. Lyman, Poland'sPresident, supra note 64.
244. See Piotr Mikuli, An Explicit ConstitutionalChange by Means of an Ordinary
Statute? On a Bill Concerning the Reform of the National Council of the Judiciary in
Poland, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Feb. 23, 2017), https://verfassungsblog.de/an-explicitconstitutional-change-by-means-of-an-ordinary-statute-on-a-bill-concerning-the[https://perma.cc/VM2Hreform-of-the-national-council-of-the-judiciary-in-poland/
MQJE] (archived Aug. 1, 2018) (noting CT case law stating interference with judicial
terms requires extraordinary constitutionally justified reasons and a proportional test
to be met).
245. See generally Case C-286/12, European Comm'n v. Hungary, 2012 E.C.R. 687
(declaring lowering compulsory retirement ages for judges, without sufficient connection
to appropriate objectives, goes against equal treatment in employment).
246. See JUSTICE SCOREBOARD, supra note 206, at 43 (showing no EU member
state allows another branch of government to have sole authority over removing judges
from office).

1178

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 51:1153

5. Training for Judges
Poland currently offers, but does not require, initial and general
in-service training for judges. 2 47 In contrast, twenty-two EU member
states require at least initial training, and ten of those also require
general in-service training. 2 4 8 Another six member states require inservice training on management of the court, such as handling
caseloads. 2 4 9 Twenty-three EU member states provide judges with
training on communication with the press and involved parties. 25 0
Perhaps informative of Poland's training program in this respect,
Poland did not communicate its data on communication training to the
EC. 2 5 1 Participation rates for judicial training are also low in Polandfewer than 10 percent of judges participate in training on EU law,
which is one of the lowest rates in the EU. 25 2 Based on the data from
the EU Justice Scoreboard, then, judicial training in Poland is lacking
compared to other EU member states.
In summary, as the PiS Party argues, the Polish judiciary has
room for improvement. Polish judges appear to receive very limited
training once on the bench 2 5 3 and, in certain types of cases, there is
room to improve the judiciary's efficiency in adjudication. 2 54 However,
for the most part, the PiS Party is incorrect about the judiciary's
efficiency-its efficiency in most types of cases ranks in the top half of
the EU. 2 5 5 Further, the PiS Party's claim that the reform bills align
Poland with the rest of the EU is false. The changes to the KRS, which
give control of the nomination and appointment process to the PiS
Party, and the forced retirement of 40 percent of the bench, are at odds
with the nomination, appointment, and removal procedures of the rest
of the EU. 25 6 Nomination, appointment, and removal procedures are
three factors relevant to Feld and Voigt's study of de jure and de facto
independence greater political control over those procedures will hurt
judicial independence. 2 5 7 Those three procedures also factor into
Geyh's legal culture paradigm-more regulation in the political
dimension may affect the ethical and adjudicative dimensions. 2 5 8 As a

247. Id. at 28.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 30.
251. See id. (showing Poland failed to report this data to the EC).
252. See id. at 29 (comparing Poland's participations rates with other EU member
states).
253. See id. (showing that less than 10 percent of Polish judges participate in
continuous training activities in EU law or of another member state).
254. See supra Part III.D.2.
255. See JUSTICE SCOREBOARD, supra note 206, at 7-16.
256. See supra Part HI.D.3-4.
257. See supra Part III.C.2.
258. See supra Part III. C.1.
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result, the reform bills threaten judicial independence, and therefore
the rule of law, in Poland.

IV. SOLUTION
As explained above, the PiS Party's reform bills clearly threaten
judicial independence in Poland. As a result, the reform bills threaten
25 9
Duda's
the rule of law-one of the EU's core principles and values.
26 0
only temporarily
unexpected decision to veto two of the reform bills
delayed the PiS Party's attack on the judiciary, as revised bills have
26 1
and the PiS Party continues to pursue
now been signed into law,
26 2
Whether the PiS Party ultimately
other changes to Polish laws.
achieves all of its goals or not, the reform bills and the domestic and
international responses to them provide a useful lens through which to
consider possible solutions. If, as some commentators suggest, the
situation in Poland represents the battle between nationalist populism
26 3
then it is important to determine how the
and Western democracy,
EU, or groups within Poland, can fight back against these types of
attacks on Western values.

A. The Argument againstArticle 7 Sanctions
The most common solution proposed by commentators is the
imposition of Article 7 sanctions, which may result in stripping Poland
26 4
After all, the EU implemented
of its voting rights on the Council.
2 65
The
Article 7 specifically for situations such as the one in Poland.
EU desired a process for sanctioning a member state when the member

259. See TEU, supra note 21, art. 2 (listing the EU's core principles and values
protected by Article 7).
260. See EKIERT, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that Duda has supported the PiS Party
since he was elected, but unexpectedly vetoed two of the three laws).
261. Government Coup, supra note 14.
262. Duda recently called for a referendum on changing the Polish constitution.
The arguments the PiS Party offers for changing the constitution are familiar-the PiS
Party claims the current constitution protects former communists, and that changing it
will create a more democratically developed constitution. See Polish president seeks
November referendum on constitution,AP NEWS (May 3, 2018), https://www.apnews.com
/36a7175572374aa6bbbf0dc8149567e8 [https://perma.cclVM2H-MQJE] (archived Aug.
2, 2018).
263. See, e.g., Charles A. Kupchan, The Battle Line for Western Values Runs
Through Poland, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/opini
onleurope-western-values-poland.html [https://perma.cc/JCH9-8BP7] (archived Aug. 2,
2018) ("As the temptations of nationalist populism spread, Europe has responsibility for
holding down the Western fort. The primary battle right now is over Poland, which is
deepening its descent into illiberalism.").
264. See, e.g., Zalan, supra note 18 (discussing launching Article 7 procedures).
265. See Btirca, supra note 145, at 689-90 (explaining the reason for adopting
Article 7).
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state threatened to violate the EU's core values. 2 66 Since Poland is
threatening the rule of law, a core EU value, it makes sense to use the
Article 7 framework to punish Poland and pressure the PiS Party to
realign itself with EU values. However, there are serious problems
with this approach.
The first problem is that Article 7 sanctions require unanimous
consent by member states, and Hungary steadfastly refuses to vote in
favor of any punishments against Poland. 2 6 7 Orban's government
pledged to veto any attempt to impose Article 7 sanctions on Poland. 2 6 8
The second problem is that even if Hungary did not impede the EU's
efforts, the imposition of Article 7 sanctions may simply increase antiEU sentiment among Poland's populace. In other words, rather than
pulling Poland back in line with EU values, the sanctions may push
Poland even further away. This concern is credible considering the
result of the Haider affair in Austria. 26 9 Haider cast the EU's
attempted sanctions
as bullying Austria
when it followed
parliamentary procedures, 270 and the PiS Party is likely to do the
same-the PiS Party contends its reforms were simply the result of a
democratic process. 2 7 1 However, the fear of the Polish people accepting
this view is mitigated some by the fact that the Polish public's view of
the EU is more positive than held by those of Austria or Hungary. 2 72
Still, regardless of whether the Polish public would support EU
sanctions, the unanimous consent requirement makes this route
impossible so long as Hungary supports the PiS Party.
Some commentators contend that, even if imposition of Article 7
sanctions is not realistically feasible, the EU should force a vote on
Poland's actions anyways. 2 73 The argument for doing so is that it will
force all member states to take a stand one way or the other.2 7 4 If the

266. Id.
267. Kupchan, supra note 263.
268. Id.
269. See, e.g., EKIERT, supra note 4, at 7 (describing the political fallout of the
Haider affair).
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., id. at 4 (explaining the PiS Party's justifications for the reform bills).
272. See CBOS PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, OPINIONS ABOUT
MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION IN POLAND, CZECH REPUBLIC, SLOVAKIA, AND
HUNGARY
1
(2017),
http://www.cbos.pl/EN/publications/reports/2017/103_17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C3TU-H7GR] (archived Aug. 2, 2018) [hereinafter OPINIONS ABOUT
MEMBERSHIP] (showing 52 percent of Poles strongly support membership in the EU
while less than one-third of Hungarians, Slovaks, and Czechs say the same).
273. See Kupchan, supra note 263 ("[E]ven if Hungary blocks these moves, the
effort itself will send a strong message to Poles."); see also Maximilian Steinbeis, Article
7 and Us, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Dec. 16, 2017), https://verfassungsblog.de/article-7-andus/ [https://perma.cc/4XCE-BXGZ] (archived Aug. 2, 2018) (arguing doing so will force
the governments of EU member states to announce where they stand on the crisis in
Poland).
274. Id.
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events in Poland are representative of similar actions in other EU
27 6
member states 2 75 and the broader nationalist populism movement,
then forcing a vote would require each member state to explicitly show
which side they support. 277 Therefore, forcing a vote will increase
transparency of where member states' leaders stand and create a more
open debate about these issues. 2 78 However, there has already been
much straightforward international response to Poland's actions.
Germany and France condemned the reform bills as a threat to EU
values, Luxembourg questioned whether Poland should remain in the
EU, Slovakia intimated that it stood by France and Germany, and only
279
If the debate is
Hungary unequivocally supported Poland's actions.
already occurring and is transparent, there seems little use in forcing
a vote that will inevitably fail because of Hungary's effective veto
power.
Other commentators suggest circumventing Hungary's veto power
7 sanctions on Hungary and Poland
by imposing Article
2 80
Voting on imposing sanctions on Hungary and
simultaneously.
Poland simultaneously would remove Hungary's veto power because
the member states under consideration for those sanctions do not get
to vote. 2 8 1 Therefore, a single vote against Hungary and Poland would
exclude both countries and avoid either being able to veto the
sanctions. A couple proposals have been offered for how to justify
voting simultaneously on sanctions for Hungary and Poland. One
justification is that Hungary and Poland are both committing rule of
law violations-due to separate legislation under consideration by
Hungary's Parliament that may threaten judicial independence-and,
28 2
Another justification is that
therefore, one vote is sufficient.

275. See id. (suggesting Romania's government also intends to take control of its
judiciary).
276. Kupchan, supra note 263.
277. Steinbeis, supra note 273.
278. Id.
279. See supra Part II.E.
280. See, e.g., Alexander Thiele, Art. 7 EUV im Quadrat? Zur M6glichkeit yon
Rechtsstaats-Verfahren gegen mehrere Mitgliedsstaaten, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (July 24,
2017), https://verfassungsblog.de/art-7-euv-im-quadrat-zur-moeglichkeit-von-rechtss
taats-verfahren-gegen-mehrere-mitgliedsstaaten/ [https://perma.cc/FG9W-HLSV]
(archived Aug. 2, 2018) (suggesting Hungary's veto can be circumvented by a common
procedure against Poland and Hungary); see also Kim Lane Scheppele, Can Poland be
Sanctioned by the EU? Not Unless Hungary is Sanctioned Too, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Oct.
24, 2016), https://verfassungsblog.de/can-poland-be-sanctioned-by-the-eu-not-unlesshungary-is-sanctioned-too/ [https://perma.cc/93XU-MY37] (archived Aug. 2, 2018) ("If
sanctions are pending against both at the same time, neither should have the legal
capacity to veto sanctions against the other.").
281. Thiele, supra note 280.
282. See Scheppele, supra note 280 (discussing justifications for launching Article
7 sanctions against two member states simultaneously).
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Hungary is colluding with Poland in order to undermine the legitimate
imposition of sanctions. 2 8 3
However, no matter the justification, this scheme would require
an extremely broad reading of Article 7. The text of Article 7 repeatedly
refers to voting and imposing sanctions upon a singular member state:
''a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State," "the Council shall
hear the Member State," "serious and persistent breach by .a Member
State," and "the Member State in question." 2 84 Further, even if the
Polish people generally have a favorable view of the EU, this approach
includes a realistic possibility of only increasing anti-EU sentiment in
Hungary. The Hungarian public already has a lower view of the EU, 28 5
so a response similar to that of the Haider affair in Austria is possible.
B. Methods for Applying Exterior Pressure
1. Withholding Structural Funds from Poland
Another potential option for the EU in response to the reform bills
is to exert financial pressure on Poland. Poland currently receives more
funds from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and
Cohesion Fund (CF) than any other EU member state. 28 6 The ERDF
provides resources to member states in order to "strengthen economic
and social cohesion in the EU by correcting imbalances between its
regions." 2 8 7 The resources are directed towards innovation and
research, growing a low-carbon economy, and supporting small and
medium enterprises. 2 88 The CF provides resources to member states
with particularly low gross national incomes per capita. 2 89 Most of the
CF aid goes towards transportation or environmental projects. 2 9 0
Between these two funds, Poland is receiving over 62 billion euros
between 2014 and 2020.291 That amount is approximately three times
higher than the next highest total-Italy is receiving a little over 20

283. Thiele, supra note 280.
284. TEU, supra note 21, art. 7 (emphasis added).
285. OPINIONS ABOUT MEMBERSHIP, supra note 272.
286. EKIERT, supra note 4, at 11; see also Available budget 2014-2020, EUR.
COMMISSION (Sept. 15, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/regional-policy/en/funding/availablebudget/ [https://perma.cc/97XZ-M8BJ] (archived Aug. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Available
budget] (providing information on ERDF and CF funds).
287. European Regional Development Fund, EUR. COMMISSION (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/regional-policy/en/funding/erdf/ [https://perma.cc/E8ZQ-73L4]
(archived Aug. 20, 2018).
288. Id.
289. Cohesion Fund, EUR. COMMISSION (Sept. 19, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/region
al-policy/en/funding/cohesion-fund/ [https://perma.cc/6JAW-VV2A] (archived Aug. 20,
2018).
290. Id.
291. Available budget, supra note 286.
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billion euros during the same period. 2 92 The money Poland receives
293
from these funds comes from EU taxpayers.
Discussions on future budgeting of these funds are already
29 4
underway and provide an opportunity to exert pressure on Poland.
It may not be possible to refuse to allocate funds to Poland purely on
political grounds-such as refusing to allocate funds so long as the PiS
Party remains in power. 2 95 However, the EC already places stringent
2 96
Some of these conditions
conditions on nations that receive funds.
297
If the EC
involve antidiscrimination and gender-equality measures.
is already capable of placing those specific legal rights as conditions on
the funds, it is plausible for the EC to also place requirements about
upholding the rule of law more generally.
Unlike Article 7 sanctions, which only impose voting sanctions
that the PiS Party may not care about, reducing the funds Poland
receives from the ERDF and CF would place serious pressure on the
PiS Party. The PiS Party relies on receiving these funds in order to
29 8
Further, some of the funds are
implement Kaczynski's policies.
to its political supporters, in
Party
PiS
the
by
allocated
currently being
to ensure fair bidding
meant
procedures
and
rules
of
violation
29 9
The possibility of losing these funds may be sufficient
processes.
pressure to force the PiS Party to reevaluate its policies.

2. Suspension from the Schengen Area
The Schengen Area is comprised of twenty-six European countries
that entered into an agreement allowing for the free movement of
30 0
In essence, it creates a
people and goods between their borders.
single external border around all of the Schengen Area countries and

292. Id.
293. EKIERT, supra note 4, at 11.
294. See The Futureof EU Finances:New Cohesion Report Fuels the Discussionon
EU Funds After 2020, EUR. COMMISSION (Oct. 9, 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/regional-pol
icy/en/newsroom/news/2017/10/10-09-2017-the-future-of-eu-finances-new-cohesionrepor
]
[https://perma.cc/GN5N-2WWMV
t-fuels-the-discussion-on-eu-funds-after-2020
(archived Aug. 20, 2018) (noting the beginning of discussions about budgeting the next
round of funds).
295. EKIERT, supra note 4, at 11.
296. See EC Observations on the Partnership Agreement with Poland (EC) Ref.
Ares (2014)574554 of Apr. 03, 2014, at 34-39 (describing the general ex-ante conditions
Poland must meet).
297. Id. at 34-35.
298. EKIERT, supra note 4, at 11.
299. Id.
300. List of Schengen Area Countries, SCHENGEN VISA INFO (2017),
https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visa-countries-list/ [https://perma.cc/XC224TE3] (archived Sept. 6, 2018) (providing background information on the Schengen
area).

1184

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 51:1153

removes all borders inside the area.3 0 1 In other words, once someone
legally enters one country in the Schengen Area they may freely travel
to any other country in the area without going through further border
or security checks. 30 2 For example, someone in France can drive
through Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria, Italy, and
return home without ever having their passport checked or being
subjected to border control procedures. The Schengen Area includes all
but six EU member states. 303 The Schengen Area benefits member
countries not only by allowing the free movement of their own citizens
within the area but also by increasing trade with other member
countries and stimulating tourism within each country. 30 4 Poland's
membership in the Schengen Area is important to Kaczynski and the
PiS Party-when Poland was accepted into the Schengen Area in 2008,
Lech Kaczynski was president and held a celebration at Poland's
border with Lithuania, during which he applauded the PiS Party's
major role in getting Poland accepted. 3 0 5
Membership in the Schengen Area, however, requires extensive
cooperation between member countries. 3 0 6 One precondition for
joining the Schengen Area is being able to efficiently cooperate with
law enforcement agencies of the other member countries.3 0 7 This
includes judicial cooperation. 3 0 8 Due to the free movement of people
throughout the Schengen Area, countries within the area desire
similar criminal procedures, regulations governing prosecutorial
bodies, and other legislation in each member country. 3 09 It makes
sense that before a new country is added to the Schengen Area member

301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See id. (emphasizing only the UK and Ireland opted-out and that the other
four EU member states-Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Cyprus-are seeking
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304. See generally CEMAL KARAKAS, EuR. PARLIAMENT RESEARCH SERV., THE
EcoNOMIC IMPACT OF SUSPENDING SCHENGEN, (2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eulR
egData/etudes/ATAG/2016/579074/EPRSATA(2016)579074_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/3
HAK-6UTZ] (archived Aug. 20, 2018) (discussing the economic impact of the Schengen
area on member countries).
305. See Michal Wojtas, Poland Joins Schengen as Border-free Europe Expands,
KRAKOW
POST
(Jan.
10,
2008),
http://www.krakowpost.com/909/2008/01
[https://perma.cc/N5JW-APTA] (archived Aug. 20, 2018) (discussing Poland's acceptance
into the Schengen area).
306. The Areas of Schengen Cooperation,EUROSKOP, https://www.euroskop.cz/842
3/sekce/the-areas-of-schengen-cooperation/
(last
visited
Mar.
1,
2018)
[https://perma.cc/GGJ7-WFA9] (archived Aug. 20, 2018) [hereinafter The Areas of
Schengen Cooperation].
307. Schengen Area, EuR. COMMIssION, (Mar. 1, 2018) https://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-en
[https://perma.cc/K7UQ6AVR] (archived Aug. 20, 2018).
308. The Areas of Schengen Cooperation, supra note 306.
309. See id. (explaining the different preconditions for acceptance into the
Schengen area).
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countries want to ensure that the legal system in the new country will
treat travelers fairly.3 10 In other words, member countries want to
ensure that the rule of law will be followed throughout the area, which
is one reason Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia have not yet been
admitted to the Schengen Area.3 1 1
Once a country joins the Schengen Area, however, it still must
meet obligations and pass either annual or multi-annual
evaluations. 3 12 Following an evaluation, a report drafted by EC
representatives describes any shortcomings in the country, along with
possible remedial actions and a deadline for their implementation. 313
If a country fails to remediate the issues, Article 26 of the Schengen
Border Code (SBC) allows for the re-establishment of internal border
3 14
controls between that country and the rest of the Schengen Area.
315
this action only requires support from a
Unlike Article 7 sanctions,
qualified majority, and can last for up to two years. 3 1 6 The EU
threatened Greece with this procedure during the migration crisis in
2015 and 2016.317 Large numbers of migrants entered Greece's
borders-and therefore obtained access to all Schengen countries318
without going through appropriate border control.

310. See Heather Grabbe & Stefan Lehne, Defending EU Values in Poland and
Hungary, CARNEGIE EUR. (Sept. 4, 2017), http://carnegieeurope.eul2017/09/04/defending
-eu-values-in-poland-and-hungary-pub-72988 [https://perma.cc/3GB4-Z92P] (archived
Aug. 20, 2018) ("[Miembers rely on each other's police and customs authorities to enforce
the law fairly.").
311. See Hugo Brady, The EU Must Fight Corruptionand Defend the Rule of Law,
CTR. FOR EUR. REFORM (June 14, 2012), http://www.cer.eu/insights/eu-must-fightcorruption-and-defend-rule-law [https://perma.cc/GLN9-K5J7] (archived Aug. 20, 2018)
(stating that Bulgaria and Romania's "low judicial standards remain a serious source of
concern five years after accession to the Union, damaging both countries' chances of
joining Schengen"); see also Georgi Gotev, Slovenia Says It Would Be 'Very Funny' If
CroatiaJoined Schengen, EURACTV (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.euractiv.com/section/en
largement/news/slovenia-says-itwouldbeveryfunny-if-croatia-joined-schengen/[https://p
erma.cc/KK98-J4BG] (archived Aug. 20, 2018) (quoting Slovenian officials suggesting
Croatia's lack of respect for the rule of law threatens their admission to the Schengen
area).
312. European Commission Press Release IP/16/211, Commission Adopts
Schengen Evaluation Report on Greece and Proposes Recommendations to Address
Deficiencies in External Border Management (Feb. 2, 2016) [hereinafter European
Commission Press Release].
313. Id.
314. Council Directive 1051/2013, art. 26, 2013 O.J. (L 295) 1 (EU) [hereinafter
Council Directive].
315. See supra Part III.A.
316. European Commission Press Release, supra note 312.
317. Gabriela Baczynska & Tom Korkemeier, Greece Threatened with Expulsion
from Schengen over Migration Crisis, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2016, 5:05 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe- migrants-ministers/greece-threatened-withexpulsion-from-schengen-over-migration-crisis-idUSKCNOV315L [https://perma.ce/MR
H6-WPDB] (archived Aug. 20, 2018).
318. Id.
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While Poland's judicial reform bills admittedly differ in terms of
type of violation from Greece's failure to monitor its borders, the EU
should consider threatening Poland with expulsion as well. As noted
above, respect for the rule of law is a precondition for admission to the
Schengen Area. Article 26 of the SBC refers to "serious deficiencies
relating to external border control," 3 19 but Article 3a of the SBC also
proclaims, "Member States shall act in full compliance with . . . the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union," 3 20 which
includes the rule of law. 3 2 1 Given the importance of judicial
cooperation and the rule of law within the Schengen Area, Poland's
reform bills that threaten judicial independence and the rule of law
also threaten the effective management of the Schengen Area.
Requiring member countries to meet preconditions and undergo
regular reviews is pointless if member countries can still take actions
that would have prevented them from joining the Schengen Area in the
first place. Therefore, Poland's reform bills should provide a basis for
threatening expulsion from the Schengen Area.
3. Pressure from European Courts
Another avenue available for placing external pressure on the PiS
Party is through the European courts. In May of 2016, Poland issued a
European Arrest Warrant (EAW) for a Polish national, Artur Celmer,
accused of drug trafficking. 32 2 Celmer was arrested in Ireland and was
expected to be extradited back to Poland. 3 2 3 However, following the
passage of the reform bills, Celmer argued that the rule of law in
Poland had deteriorated and he therefore objected to extradition. 3 24
Ireland's High Court stated the reform bills "systematically damaged"
the rule of law, which is "essential for mutual trust in the operation of
the [EAW]. "325 The High Court then referred the issue to the ECJ

319. Council Directive, supra note 314, art. 26.
320. Commission Regulation 610/2013 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 June 2013, art. 3a.
321. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, pmbl., 2000 J.O. (C
364) 1.
322. E6in O'Keeffe, Referrals and Reactions: Polandand the Rule of Law, INST. OF
INT'L & EUR. AFFAIRS (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.iiea.com/security-andjustice/referrals-reactions-poland-rule-law/
[https://perma.cclLZ2W-U4MD] (archived
Aug. 20, 2018).
323. Id.
324. Colm Keena, Extradition to Poland Case Comes Back Before Judge, IRISH
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-andlaw/extradition-to-poland-case-comes-back-before-judge-1.3428657
[https://perma.cc/N
N7E-T26H] (archived Aug. 20, 2018).
325. Michelle Stoddart, Ireland Refers Landmark Polish Extradition Case to
Europe's Top Court, POLITICO (Mar. 13, 2018, 5:31 PM), https://www.politico.eularticle/
ireland-poland-extradition-case-referred-to-europe-top-court-ecj/ [https://perma.cc/33PN
-CY9J] (archived Aug. 20, 2018).
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before making a final decision. 3 26 The ECJ was asked to rule on
whether the reform bills stripped Poland's judiciary of its
independence and whether the EAW system was jeopardized as a
result.3 2 7 The PiS Party responded by accusing the High Court of
328
engaging in political games and showing bias.
If the ECJ rules that the reform bills undermine the rule of law
and the EAW system, then more cases should be brought before the
32 9
to
ECJ in other contexts-from contract and family law cases
3 30
If the ECJ rules that Polish
commercial arbitration disputes.
parties are unable to force adjudication or arbitration in Polish courts
due to the PiS Party's legislation, then the PiS Party will face increased
33 1
However, it is also possible that the
pressure from its own citizens.
ECJ rules that the reform bills do not violate the rule of law, or that
even if they violate the rule of law they do not undermine the EAW
system. The Celmer case can be considered a test case for how the ECJ
views the reform bills, 3 3 2 and the outcome will determine whether the
ECJ can be used to apply pressure on the PiS Party moving forward.

C. Reform from within the Judiciary
Despite the criticism that the PiS Party is removing judicial
independence and threatening the rule of law in Poland, the PiS Party
33 3
At this
is correct that the Polish people desired judicial reform.
from
reforms
prevent
point, it is too late for the Polish judiciary to
33 4
However, even
originating in the other branches of government.
with the passage of these reform bills, the Polish judiciary should still
be interested in implementing self-reform if doing so minimizes the
chances and scope of further external reform. Further, with the rise of
3 35
the situation in
nationalist-populist movements more broadly,
Poland may be taken as a warning of what is to come for the judiciaries
of other countries. As such, looking at how Poland could have
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331. See id. (discussing potential pressure from companies within Poland).
332. O'Keeffe, supra note 322.
333. Parliament Votes, supra note 103 (finding approximately 60 percent of
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334. See Government Coup, supra note 14.
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prevented this problem in the first place provides a useful case study
for other countries' judiciaries.
Looking at Poland's situation under the framework provided by
Geyh, 3 36 reform from within the judiciary makes sense as a solution.
The public's concerns about judicial corruption and inefficiency can be
seen as damaging in all three of Geyh's offered perspectives-the
adjudicative, ethical, and political dimensions. The adjudicative
dimension is harmed if the public believes judges are corrupt-parties
in a case will not trust that the judge is providing them a fair hearing.
Corruption and inefficiency can also harm the ethical dimensionacting corruptly and slowly can be seen as acting in conflict with legal
norms. Lastly, under the political dimension, if the public views judges
as corrupt, then the public will not trust that the judiciary is acting
according to public preferences.
However, as Geyh submits, all three dimensions must be
considered in order to maintain sufficient judicial independence.3 3 7
The Polish reform bills are intense regulation in the political
dimension. Therefore, even if they create a judiciary that is more
responsive to the general public, they will not solve the problems
viewed through the adjudicative and ethical dimensions. The PiS
Party's bill allowing them to replace judges with new ones of their own
choosing3 3 8 will still cause parties in a case to fear that they are not
receiving a fair hearing, thereby retaining issues in the adjudicative
dimension. The amount of control the PiS Party has over judges'
tenures3 3 9 will now cause the public to ask whether the judiciary is
acting according to judicial norms or political orders, thereby retaining
the issues in the ethical dimension.
Instead, reform from within the judiciary could fix issues within
the adjudicative and ethical dimensions while maintaining an
appropriate balance with the political dimension. For instance, the
Polish judiciary lacks many of the training opportunities that are
available in many other EU member states, and many judges within
Poland do not participate in the training opportunities that are
available. 34 0 Improving this aspect of the judiciary, particularly with
respect to participation rates and including training on managing
caseloads and communication with the public and involved parties,
could result in improvements in the adjudicative and ethical
dimensions. If more judges take part in ethical training, then the fears
over corruption within the judiciary will be mitigated, improving
judicial independence within the ethical dimension. If the judiciary
partakes in more training on communicating with the press and
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338.
339.
340.
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parties, such that the public is more aware of how the judiciary
functions, then there will be improved judicial independence as viewed
from the adjudicative dimension. In other words, if the public is more
aware of how the judiciary functions, then parties will be more likely
to believe they are receiving a fair hearing. Lastly, since the Polish
3
ven if that claim is
public believes the judiciary is inefficient 41
342
increasing training on managing caseloads, which
-then
false
should help with increasing judicial efficiency, should improve judicial
independence in the political dimension because the public will see
that the judiciary is being responsive to the public's criticisms.
Poland's situation may be representative of what is to come as
nationalist populist movements take root throughout eastern Europe.
Unless other nations' judiciaries pay attention, they risk facing similar
forced reform from the other branches of government. Judiciaries that
are aware of the need for the public's trust should acknowledge areas
in which they can improve. By working to improve its reputation with
the public, the judiciary can provide some level of protection against
that reputation degrading to the point that the public turns to the other
branches of government to reform the judiciary. In doing so, judiciaries
can avoid the over-regulation in the political dimension that Poland's
judiciary now faces.

V.

CONCLUSION

Despite the claims from the PiS Party that reform is necessary
and simply a part of the democratic process, the reform bills violate
judicial independence-a critical element of the EU value of the rule of.
law. 34 3 While the broadly proposed suggestion of implementing Article
7 sanctions is not possible-despite being created for situations such
as this-due to support for Poland from Hungary, there are other
34 4
The structural funds
options available for deterring the PiS Party.
on
the PiS Party, and
pressure
financial
provide a method of placing
reputational
involves
Area
Schengen
the
from
the risk of suspension
3 45
pressure as well as financial pressure.
While it is too late for the Polish judiciary to prevent reform by the
PiS Party entirely, it may be able to minimize the risk of further future
reforms. By viewing the situation through the three perspectives
proposed by Geyh, it is clear that the reform bills are over-regulation
in the political dimension that harm the adjudicative and ethical

341.
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dimensions. 3 46 By implementing self-reform, the Polish judiciary could
create changes that respond to the public's desires while also
maintaining an appropriate balance between the political,
adjudicative, and ethical dimensions. 34 7 While the situation in Poland
may be too advanced to be rescued by this type of self-reform, it
provides a useful warning to judiciaries in other countries and a
possible insight into preventing a similar outcome as nationalist
populist movements continue to take hold throughout eastern Europe.
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